6 minWorld
Houthi Red Sea Campaign Tests US Role in Yemen War
The Houthis are not a separate conflict but part of the same regional confrontation with Iran, and their advances around the Bab el-Mandeb threaten global trade and energy routes. Limited US air power could speed up the campaign without making Washington responsible for the war.
The Houthis are not a separate conflict. The Iran-aligned group, designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization, is waging a campaign against Yemen's Saudi-backed government that forms part of the same regional confrontation with Tehran, and its advances around the Bab el-Mandeb have consequences that reach far beyond Yemen's borders.
Some in Washington would prefer to treat the Houthis as somebody else's problem. The United States is already deeply engaged in the standoff with Iran, and there is little appetite for widening the battlefield with midterm elections approaching. The Houthis have also given Washington a reason to limit its involvement by signaling that American shipping will not be targeted.
But geography makes Yemen difficult to ignore. The Houthis have strengthened their position along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world's most important maritime choke points. Roughly 22 percent of global seaborne container trade passes through the Red Sea. When the route is disrupted, ships must travel around Africa, lengthening journeys and raising freight and insurance costs.
The battlefield picture is beginning to move in the right direction for the Yemeni government. Government forces, supported by Saudi air power, have expelled the Houthis from some strategically important areas around the Bab el-Mandeb and are demonstrating their capacity to operate effectively. Those gains remain vulnerable, and the battle will have its ups and downs, but the momentum is encouraging.
That shift changes the calculation for American involvement. The United States already provides Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeting support while stopping short of direct strikes. American satellites and other surveillance systems can help locate missile batteries, drone facilities, command centers and mobile launchers. Direct American air power could make that intelligence considerably more effective.
US aircraft can operate directly within American intelligence, surveillance and targeting networks, allowing information gathered by satellites and other sensors to move rapidly through the sensor-to-shooter chain. Saudi aircraft can also receive sophisticated US and allied targeting information through interoperable systems, but intelligence shared with a partner may require additional dissemination, release and command steps before reaching the aircraft assigned to strike.
Even a short delay matters when a mobile missile launcher can fire, relocate and disappear within minutes. Placing American aircraft directly inside this sensor-to-shooter loop could shorten the time between detecting and attacking a target. A limited American role could concentrate on mobile missile launchers, drone facilities and other time-sensitive assets rather than expand into a large or open-ended campaign.
Direct US Air Force involvement would be helpful, but it is not critical to the campaign's success. Saudi Arabia has the aircraft, intelligence capabilities and resources necessary to support the Yemeni government, while Yemeni troops are proving capable of conducting the ground fighting themselves. Washington could make the campaign faster and more effective without assuming responsibility for the war.
The case for American support should not rest on the claim that Saudi Arabia and Yemen cannot succeed without it. It should rest on the fact that the United States has a clear interest in helping them succeed.
There is another worrying development. The Houthis are building ties with al-Shabaab in Somalia, al Qaeda's wealthy East African affiliate. American officials have warned of weapons transfers, training in drones and explosives, and tactical coordination between the groups. This raises the prospect of a militant network operating on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. Its targets may be Saudi Arabia and Yemen's government today, but there is no reason to assume its priorities will remain unchanged.
Energy security makes the issue even more consequential. Saudi Arabia exports oil through the Strait of Hormuz, but its East-West Pipeline also carries crude across the kingdom to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The pipeline provides an alternative route when Hormuz becomes dangerous. Its strategic value declines sharply if the Houthis can threaten the Red Sea simultaneously.
Iran and its allies could therefore apply pressure at two critical choke points: Tehran around Hormuz and the Houthis around the Bab el-Mandeb. This is not merely a Saudi or Yemeni problem. China depends heavily on Gulf energy flows, Europe relies on the Red Sea and Suez trading system, and American energy production does not insulate American consumers from global oil prices.
The current fighting also exposes the magnitude of the mistake made at Hodeidah in 2018. Saudi- and Emirati-backed Yemeni forces had advanced to the outskirts of the city and placed the Houthis' principal Red Sea port under severe pressure. Western governments feared that fighting around the port would interrupt supplies of food, fuel and medicine. Those concerns were legitimate, but the solution imposed left the Houthis in control of a vital port and allowed them to consolidate their position along the coast.
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