Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov on [date of dismissal, if known, otherwise omit] after the minister failed to complete three key priorities set in January 2026, according to official sources and reports. The dismissal follows a period of tension between Fedorov and the military command, culminating in a public conflict over strategic direction.
Fedorov was appointed defense minister on January 14, 2026. Just over two weeks later, on January 30, Zelensky publicly outlined three main tasks: closing the airspace and strengthening air defense, resolving the problem of forced mobilization and so-called «busification,» and launching a genuinely functioning contract army model. Drones, technological substitution of artillery, and reducing overpayments were mentioned separately, not as core priorities.
An assessment of Fedorov's performance shows that none of the three priority tasks were fully completed. While the Defense Ministry reported increased effectiveness in intercepting drones and cruise missiles, the airspace was not completely closed. The structural reform of territorial recruitment centers remained a work in progress, though automation extended about 90% of deferrals through the «Reserve+» system. The new contract system was only launched as a pilot project on June 15–16, 2026, and is not scheduled to be fully operational until 2028. Thus, the three priority tasks were either unfinished or at an early stage of implementation.
Instead of focusing on the presidential priorities, Fedorov concentrated on technological projects and defense procurement. His final report listed 22 achievements, most of which related to drones and robotic systems, the Brave1 Market and combat score system, procurement of equipment and weapons, grants to manufacturers, long-range strikes and missile programs, defense exports, and artificial intelligence. Only one of the 22 items addressed transformation of service conditions and contracts. The territorial recruitment centers and the «busification» problem were not directly mentioned in the list of achievements.
In a Telegram post, Fedorov stated that upon taking over the ministry without the necessary budget, his team redirected funds originally allocated for cash allowances at the end of the year to drones and other technological areas. This redistribution requires a separate financial audit to determine the legal basis, the amounts involved, and who made the decision.
The scale of the financial and technological infrastructure under Fedorov is substantial. According to official Defense Ministry data, in less than a year, more than 400 units ordered equipment worth over 33 billion hryvnias through Brave1 Market. More than 500,000 drones were ordered, and the catalog contained over 800 items. Payment and delivery are handled by the state through DOT-Chain Defence. Data from DELTA, Mission Control, and other systems are used to form centralized procurement needs. This infrastructure connects data on unit combat effectiveness, score allocation, product selection, manufacturers, state payment, and future centralized procurement. While the existence of such a system does not indicate corruption, its scale makes audits of algorithms, conflicts of interest, manufacturer access, and distribution of state funds mandatory.
Fedorov also publicly claimed credit for systemic military operations. His final report included achievements such as the «logistical lockdown» of the Russian army and the beginning of the isolation of Crimea, increased air intercept rates, Operation «Ashan» that allegedly halted a mechanized offensive for six months, returning the initiative to Ukraine on the battlefield, and confirmed enemy losses and record results from drone units. However, these results are the product of the General Staff, military command, Unmanned Systems Forces, SBU, GUR, Navy, specific units, and manufacturers, not just one minister. The question arises: where does legitimate ministry reporting on created infrastructure end, and personal appropriation of military operations results begin?
The conflict between Fedorov and the military leadership came to a head on July 16, when Fedorov publicly confirmed that he had proposed replacing Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky. Zelensky did not agree. After that, according to Fedorov, most ministry initiatives faced resistance, and the conflict ended with an ultimatum from the commander-in-chief. At the same time, Fedorov acknowledged Syrsky's contributions to the defense of Kyiv, the Kharkiv operation, and the liberation of Kherson. This was not a rumor of personal animosity but a confirmed struggle over military policy direction and personnel control.
From a managerial perspective, Zelensky faced a choice between keeping the minister and preserving the existing command vertical of the army. According to sources from Ukrainska Pravda, the constant conflict between the Defense Ministry and the military command was the main reason for the decision not to keep Fedorov in the new government.
Fedorov's final report, published on July 15 at 18:17, garnered millions of views. A separate text about what was not achieved appeared a minute later, ending with the phrase «To be continued.» A video was also published. This suggests a coordinated media campaign to shape public perception ahead of the expected dismissal.
